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United States (U.S.) author and journalist, Max Boot, describes in Savage Wars of 
Peace how in “many ways the chaotic post-Cold War environment resembles that of the 
post-Napoleonic world…”1  According to Boot, the premier role that Great Britain 
played in the post-Napoleonic world transferred to the U.S. in the post-Cold War world.  
If this is the case, then how does the U.S. control nations and nation-states throughout the 
world?  The short answer is by creating a framework of alliances and international 
organizations (the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, United Nations, U.S.-Japanese 
Security Alliance etc); the U.S. looks to legitimately control those inside and outside the 
sphere of influence via these international organizations.  The problem arises when the 
U.S. engages nation-states not capable of working within the U.S.-led international 
system.  If the U.S. is not able to influence nation-states operating outside the 
international system, then how does the U.S. control them?  Since the U.S. today finds 
itself in a situation  similar to that of Britain in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, 
the following thesis uses two case studies involving Great Britain to review and analyze 
any lessons that may be learned for exerting control in international system. 
Chapter II looks at British interactions with American Indians (Amerindians) in 
North America.  The British sought to expand their interests in North America by trying 
to control the local inhabitants.  Keeping with the British experiences, Chapter III moves 
across the globe to South Asia.  This chapter reviews the British experience in India.  In 
India as in North America, Great Britain sought to expand its control in order to further 
its national and commercial interests.  The thesis concludes, in Chapter IV, with a review 
and analysis of the materials presented in Chapters II and III.  Chapter IV seeks to take 
the two British case studies (colonial North America and India) that are not compared 
against each other, to extract potential guidelines for U.S. involvement in 
 
 
                                                 
1 Max Boot, Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of America Power (New York: Basic 
Books, 2002), xx-xxi. 
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similar situations.  Before proceeding to the case studies, one must first stop and ask the 
questions “what is control?” and “what is legitimacy?”  The answers to these questions 
establish the framework for the discussion later in this thesis. 
Since the word ‘control’ has many connotations, the idea of social control is the 
best fit when discussing ruling over or influencing others. The World of Sociology 
textbook defines social control as “the capacity of a society to regulate itself according to 
established principles and values [Social Control] typically refers to ideological rather 
than physical constraint.”2  The Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences expounds further 
with the notion that social control is “any influence exerted by society upon the 
individual.” 3  The influence exerted by society transpires from the customs and social 
interactions a society consciously and subconsciously agrees to honor.  The underlying 
purpose of social control is to establish rule and order to thwart “man’s tendency to purse 
his self-interest to the point of war of all against all…”4 
Social control, as a term and concept, conjures negative images for most 
Americans.  The idea alludes to George Orwell’s novel 1984; this novel describes a 
society where the rule and control come from a totalitarian regime.  Although this is one 
possible outcome of social control, there are many other possibilities.  Societies can 
control their members through their social interactions and via institutions (e.g., family, 
marriage, religion).  U.S. sociologist Charles H. Cooley (1864–1929) explains how group 
experiences simultaneously provide for the development of an individual and of a 
society.  These group experiences give the individual a “fundamental orientation to life,” 
and the society “its model for integrated living.”5  Additionally, one learns from one of 
the founders of American sociology, Edward A. Ross, that social control can be divided 
into two types:  ethical and political.  An ethical system of control refers to a moral order 
                                                 
2 Joseph M. Palmisano, World of Sociology. (Detroit: Gale Group, 2001), 599. 
3 Edwin Robert Anderson Seligman and Alvin Saunders Johnson, Encyclopaedia of the Social 
Sciences. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1930; 1935, 624. 
4 David L. Sills and Robert King Merton. International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. (New 
York: Macmillan, 1968), 14:382.  One should also note that the term social control is an American term but 
European sociologists use similar terms to describe the idea of providing order to humanity via social 
constraints. 
5 Sills and Merton. International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, 3:380. 
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which one sees reflected in public opinion, religion, art, suggestion, etc. A political 
system of control is more closely associated with polices based on law, ceremony, 
education, etc. 6  Combining these two systems of control, societies not only develop 
guidelines for their members’ interactions, they create methods of governance.  This 
yields a notion that a nation is the product of each society’s specific systems of control 
(ethical and political).   
Some nations continue to develop into nation-states.  A state is “a structure of 
domination and coordination including a coercive apparatus and the means to administer 
society and extract resources from it.”7  Consequently, a nation-state comprises “a 
political community whose territorial and juridical boundaries coincide with the 
boundaries of a nation.”8  The nation creates the state in its image to better and more 
effectively manage its members.  As the nation establishes a state, it must choose what 
type of political system or regime should govern its people.  A regime is “the formal and 
informal organization of center of political power, and of its relations with broader 
society. [A regime determines] who has access to political power, and how those who are 
in power deal with those who are not.”9  Some examples of different regime types are 
republics, dictatorships, and tribal councils.  The regime simply describes the “principles, 
institutions, and procedures that constitute the political system.”10  It is a government that 
operates the society’s chosen regime type.  Government refers to the “organizations and 
                                                 
6 Edward Alsworth Ross, Social Control: A Survey of the Foundations of Order, (New York: 
Macmillan Company, 1904), 
http://books.google.com/books?id=OPRY6Ou3Mm8C&printsec=frontcover&dq=social+control#, 
(accessed September 4, 2009), 411. 
7 Robert Fishman, “Rethinking State and Regime:  Southern Europe’s Transition to Democracy.” 
World Politics 42(1990): 428 as cited in Alagappa, Muthiah. Political Legitimacy in Southeast Asia: The 
Quest for Moral Authority, (Stanford:  Stanford University Press, 1995), 26. 
8 Uri Ra’anan, “The Nation-State Fallacy” In Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies, 
edited by Joseph V. Montville Lexington, Mass: Lexington Books, 1990, 5, as cited in Alagappa, Muthiah. 
Political Legitimacy in Southeast Asia: The Quest for Moral Authority, (Stanford:  Stanford University 
Press, 1995), 26.  
9 Fishman, “Rethinking State and Regime” 428 as cited in Alagappa, Political, 27.  
10 Muthiah Alagappa, Political Legitimacy in Southeast Asia: The Quest for Moral Authority, 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995), 27.  
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people charged with the duty of governing.” 11  Theoretically, government must try to 
maintain legitimacy in the eyes of the people; without this legitimacy, the society might 
seek a new government and/or regime to coordinate their societal interactions. 
This leads to a discussion of legitimacy.  As defined by German sociologist Max 
Weber, legitimacy is “the basis of every system of authority, and correspondingly of 
every kind of willingness to obey a belief by virtue of which persons exercising authority 
are lent prestige.”12 Legitimacy emerges when the society accepts governance by the 
rulers, and the rulers acknowledge the society’s acquiescence to their governing.  The 
agreement between the governors and the governed is not a static process.  As Muthiah 
Alagappa explains in Political Legitimacy in Southeast Asia, “legitimation of power is an 
interactive and therefore dynamic process among the government, the elite groups, and 
the politically significant public…”  Alagappa bases legitimacy upon four key elements: 
“shared norms and values; conformity with established rules for acquiring power; proper 
and effective use of power; and consent of the governed.”13  From these four elements, 
government and the people create the balance necessary to provide order to social 
interactions.  Without this balance, people will seek methods by which to right the 
relationship i.e., via resistance, revolution, compliance etc.  As contacts and interactions 
between nations became more and more frequent, nations themselves engage in social 
interactions and develop social controls to guide their international relations.   
For the purposes of this discussion, the thesis divides the world into two societal 
types: modern and traditional.  By no means are all societies either one or the other; but 
in order to better understand the misfit between traditional societies and the modern 
interactional social system, one needs to put all societies in one or the other camp.  How a 
 
                                                 
11 S.E. Finer, Comparative Government.  (Baltimore: Penguin, 1970), 3-4 as cited in Alagappa, 
Muthiah, Political Legitimacy in Southeast Asia: The Quest for Moral Authority, (Stanford, CA:  Stanford 
University Press, 1995), 27.  
12 Max Weber, Theory of Social and Economic Organization. Edited by Talcott Parsons. (New York: 
Free Press, 1964), 382 as cited in Alagappa, Muthiah Political Legitimacy in Southeast Asia: The Quest for 
Moral Authority, (Stanford:  Stanford University Press, 1995), 11.  
13 Muthiah Alagappa, Political Legitimacy in Southeast Asia: The Quest for Moral Authority, 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995), 27. 
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society is categorized, depends on its interactions and rules, not on the technologies it 
possesses.  A society does not become modern because it utilizes modern equipment, i.e., 
farming equipment, radios, weapons, etc. 
Sociologists compare and contrast traditional societies (ts) and modern societies 
(ms), based on five characteristics:  affectivity (ts) vs. affective neutrality (ms); collective 
(ts) vs. self-orientation (ms); particularism (ts) vs. universalism (ms); ascription (ts) vs. 
achievement (ms); and diffuseness (ts) vs. specificity (ms).14  In addition to the above 
characteristics, one also needs to know the differences between the two society’s 
economies, cultures, and politics.  Let us pause for a moment to remind ourselves that the 
following is not about absolutes; the concepts of economy, culture, and politics are not 
identical across all modern societies or all traditional societies.  There are, however, 
underlying concepts shared by all in each category.  That being said, one looks to 
understand why some traditional societies have not become, or become comfortable in, 
nation-states. 
Here it is important to refer back to economy, culture, and politics.  The social 
structures in traditional societies are based on family units.  So are the economic and 
political structures.  There are no banks, corporations, political parties, etc; decisions, 
instead, “tend to be made by…the head of the family...”15  In regard to the economy, 
people tend to live at the subsistence level.  They do not organize or implement more 
efficacious methods by which to increase production.  Their mode of production 
reinforces the traditional social structure.  Individuals work and receive compensation 
based upon their societies.  Individuals do not have divided loyalties split between their 
tribal/household leaders and their ruler/employer because tribal leaders and 
 
                                                 
14 Monte Palmer, Dilemmas of Political Development: An Introduction to Politics of the Developing 
Areas, (Itasca, Illinois: F.E. Peacock Publishers, 1989), 58.  Palmer defines the following as: affectivity- to 
view others in emotional terms colored by personal values, affective neutrality- to accept other individuals 
and institutions as neutral…willing to play by the rules, collective- to sacrifice personal values for the sake 
of the community good, self-orientation- compliance due to fear of being humiliated or punished, 
particularism- to favor family , clan or tribe, universalism- to uniformly apply rules to all individuals, 
ascription- to accord status or authority based on age, sex, linage , achievement- to grant status and 
authority based on demonstrated ability , diffuseness- to interact based upon norms and not by explicitly 
defined codes, and specificity- to interact based upon laws that are codified and sharply defined, 59–62.   
15 Palmer, Dilemmas of Political Development, 62. 
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rulers/employers are the same people; there is no real surplus for them to control. Wealth 
is not concentrated but is redistributed.  There is thus little reason for members to 
challenge existing authorities.16  
Typically, members of traditional societies become “socialized to view existing 
relationships as inspired by tradition and sanctified by the supernatural.”17  A key to 
understanding these societies is that the needs and desires of the group come before the 
needs of the individual.  Compliance is policed by one’s family.  A transgression by one 
member becomes a transgression that affects the entire family.  Understanding such core 
beliefs and values should make it clear just how hard it is to change social norms in 
traditional societies.  If one cannot wait for societies to slowly adjust on their own, what 
might modern societies do to speed up or circumvent the process? 
In The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa, Lord Fredrick Lugard suggests a 
potentially ideal method. One does need to review Lugard’s work, published in 1922, The 
Dual Mandate, which reflects many of the accepted, but nonetheless racist, theories of its 
day.  Such blatant racism, however, does not have to detract from Lugard’s observations 
about methods of social control.  His underlying notion is that modern societies can best 
control traditional societies through “continuity, decentralization [of the controlling 
government]…[and] co-operation between every link in the chain…[i.e.] government and 
commercial community, and … provincial staff and the native rulers.”18  He describes 
how one should use this as a guide during all interactions.  Its applicability depends on 
the traditional societies’ existing norms and interactions. 
Lugard offers three methods of native rule: First is self-government, which is 
European and American style governance.  Second is self-government under a native 
ruler with non-native councilors and administrators. Third is rule by a native chief 
unfettered in the control of his people but subordinate to control by of the protecting 
                                                 
16 Palmer, Dilemmas of Political Development, 63. 
17 Palmer, Dilemmas of Political Development, 64. 
18 Lord Frederick Lugard, The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa, (Hamden, Ct: Archon Books, 
1965), 193. 
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power (e.g., Britain).19  These three categories offer the baseline from which to devise 
control for established, traditional societies.  With this understanding of control, 
legitimacy, and types of social control, the thesis now proceeds with the two case studies 
and will return to these ideas and concepts in Chapter IV. 
 
                                                 
19 Lugard, The Dual Mandate, 194-197. 
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II. GREAT BRITAIN IN COLONIAL NORTH AMERCIA 
During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, European powers expanded the 
territorial claims of their empires.  The Spanish, Portuguese, Dutch, French, and British 
sent forth their explorers, traders, and conquerors to acquire new lands and to subdue the 
people of these new lands.  The goal was to accumulate more wealth for the coffers of the 
homeland, as well as wealth for the men gaining these imperial resources.  The powers’ 
representatives encountered native peoples who had to interact with them and with all of 
their neighbors.  One vivid example lies in the interaction between the British and the 
Amerindians of colonial North America. 
In order to understand the interaction between British colonists and Amerindians, 
one must first look at the historical context.  Both Great Britain and France, colonized 
North America around the same time (early 1600s).  French settlers established their 
colonies around the North American Great Lakes region.  As described in The Middle 
Ground, Richard White tells how “Frenchmen who traveled into the pays d’en haut 
[upper country]…thought they were discovering new worlds.”20  Instead of discovering 
uninhabited forests, the French encountered the native people.  In order to survive and 
later prosper, the French engaged the Amerindians in cultural and commercial exchanges.  
In contrast, the British concentrated their settlements along the eastern seaboard 
of North America.  The British, too, learned that they must interact with the local people 
in order to establish new settlements in this foreign world.  Over the next eighty years 
(1607–1689), both sets of Europeans went from needing Indians for survival to using 
Amerindians to further their imperial gains. 
The importance of 1689 in North America is that it marked the beginning of the 
four French and Indian Wars that changed the balance of European power on the America 
continent (as well as in the world).  These four wars were King William’s (1689–1697), 
Queen Anne’s 1702–1713), King George’s (1744–1748) and the Seven Year Wars 
                                                 
20 Richard White, The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 
1650-1815 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 1. 
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(1754–1763).21  The conflicts’ participants in the colonies and along the frontiers of 
North America mirrored those on the European continent.  The fighting and subsequent 
peace determined who would control the balance of power in Europe.   
At the conclusion of the final French and Indian War (the Seven Year Wars), 
Great Britain emerged as the victor and became the supreme European power in North 
America.  Now the British had to control not only their Amerindian allies, but also all the 
Amerindians in eastern North America.  Unfortunately, the British had the desire, but not 
the authority or the appropriate methods, by which to do so. 
Before one understands the methods of control used by the British after the 
French and Indian Wars, one must look at the beginnings of Amerindian-European 
relations.  Much like the Europeans, the Amerindians were divided among many nations; 
but, unlike the Europeans, most of the Amerindians did not have states to help them unify 
and control their many clans, villages, and tribes.  The exception to this was the Iroquois 
under the Great League of Peace and Power, and the Iroquois Confederacy.  The Great 
League and the Confederacy were composed of the Mohawks, Oneidas, Onondagas, 
Cayugas, and Senecas (the Five Nations). The Great League’s purpose was to “perpetuate 
peace among its member nations,” while the Confederacy’s purpose was to “deal with 
European colonists and with Indian societies outside the [Great] League.” 22  The 
Iroquois attitude toward diplomacy set the stage for the rise of the Five Nation power 
block.   
In the early 1600s, Dutch settlers traded muskets for fur with the Iroquois; these 
advanced weapons gave the Iroquois a decisive advantage over their neighbors.  The 
Iroquois embarked on a campaign to subdue neighboring tribes in order to incorporate all 
Indian nations into the Great League.  Some tribes complied while others fled west into 
the pays d’en haut or Great Lakes region.  Those Algonquian who fled west sought 
protection from the French. This forced assimilation by the Iroquois stopped in 1664 
                                                 
21 Fred Anderson, Crucible of War: The Seven Years' War and the Fate of Empire in British North 
America, 1754-1766. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2000), 11. This thesis uses the Anglo-American names 
for the French and Indian Wars. 
22 Anderson, Crucible of War, 12. 
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when the Dutch lost New Netherland to the English.23  When the Dutch left so did their 
steady supply of arms.  With this, the stage and the actors were set for the events that 
would decide the fate of North America.  The initial sides pitted the British and Iroquois 
alliance against the French and western Algonquian alliance.24 
Each imperial power took a different approach towards its alliance.  The French 
took a fatherly approach toward the western Algonquian.  France not only used colonial 
officials, it also used missionaries and fur traders to aid in the interactions with the 
Algonquian.25  The focal point of the French alliance structure was that its 
representatives (officials, priests, and traders) assumed a fatherly attitude.  In Crucible of 
War, Fred Anderson explains that: 
Algonquian fathers did not discipline their children but sought to create 
harmony, their real power stemmed from the ability to give gifts and 
mediate disputes; fathers might persuade but could not seek to exert direct 
control without forfeiting their moral authority.26 
Richard White further amplifies this idea in The Middle Ground when he 
describes the French-Algonquian alliance.  White tells how Algonquian tribes “responded 
when [the French colonial governor] summoned them…” to defend French interests 
against the British and/or the Iroquois.27  These allied tribes answered the French call to 
arms because the French governor was their benefactor.  His position was that of a 
benevolent father of all the Algonquian people, not a ruler.  His primary means of control 
were peaceful; the French would provide goods for trade as well as presents to earn favor.  
Only when “faced with disobedient children did [the French] appear armed and angry.”28  
The demonstrations of force were made by both French soldiers and other Algonquian 
                                                 
23 Anderson, Crucible of War, 14. 
24 Western Algonquian consisted of Hurons, Petuns, Neutrals, and Eries.  There were also many other  
tribes that joined the four mentioned above to gain a full list and description see White’s The Middle 
Ground  1- 49. 
25 W. J. Eccles, "The Fur Trade and Eighteenth-Century Imperialism." The William and Mary 
Quarterly 40 (1983): 342-362, http://www.jstor.org (accessed March 2, 2009). 
26 Anderson, Crucible of War, 15. 
27 White, The Middle Ground, 142. 
28 White, The Middle Ground, 142. 
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warriors.  The purpose of these combined demonstrations of force was to reinstate peace, 
so the tribe people would resume their daily lives. 
Over time, however, the alliance slowly degraded because how the French saw a 
father and how the Algonquian saw a father ultimately diverged.  An Algonquian father 
“mediated more often then he commanded [he] forgave more than he punished [and he] 
gave more than he received.”29  This frustrated the French because fulfilling these 
expectations took time and were too costly.  French in Canada preferred a Franco-
Algonquian alliance that more closely mirrored their European alliances. 
Unlike the French, the British acted less like benefactors and more like arms 
suppliers.  The British alliance with the Iroquois was similar to that with other European 
nation-states.  The British and the Iroquois Confederacy created a “commercial and 
strategic alliance, the Covenant Chain…”30  This alliance renewed British hostilities with 
the French and supplied the Iroquois with the necessary arms and support to renew their 
attacks on the Algonquian in the pays d’en haut.  The British viewed the relationship 
more as that between a superior and an inferior nation. 
The British goal was similar to that of the French:  to use the native tribes to 
expand control over local lands and resources.  The difference lay in the means they used.  
The British sought to minimize imperial costs by leveraging the local population. This 
was possible when the British first arrived on the continent because the Iroquois had 
already organized themselves into the Five Nations and the Confederacy.  The organized 
Confederacy coupled with advanced weaponry, muskets, and iron tools, gave the British 
a powerful ally capable of doing its bidding.  This plan worked for about seventy years. 
In 1689, when hostilities between the British and the French reignited in North 
America, the western Algonquian were organized, armed, and led by the French.  The 
Iroquois continued with their old battle plan.  At first, this was effective, but over time 
the French settlers and regular troops proved able to fight back.  Their resolve 
                                                 
29 White, The Middle Ground, 143. 
30 Anderson, The Crucible of War, 14. 
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strengthened their alliance with the western Algonquian.31  Because the British method of 
support was logistics only, the Iroquois did not have British soldiers fighting alongside 
them.32 
At the conclusion of King William’s War (1689–1697), the Great Nations realized 
“that the [British] were incompetent military allies…”33  With this realization, the 
Iroquois came to two conclusions: the British “had always sought to make use of them 
merely to serve [their] ends [and] the Iroquois had now to abandon all hope of ever 
driving the French out of Canada.”34 How to deal with these realities splintered the 
Iroquois between rival factions, Anglophile, Francophile, and neutral.  The rival factions’ 
leaders were eventually able to resolve the issues and to conclude an internal truce.  This 
internal truce led to truces by the Confederacy with both the British and the French.  The 
Confederacy renewed its Covenant Chain with Britain, but it also agreed with the French 
to remain neutral in future Franco-British conflicts.  
Playing the two European empires off one another worked to the Iroquois’ 
advantage.  Both France and Britain saw them as a crucial counterbalance that if lured 
into the enemy’s camp would lead to disastrous results.  As a result, each side graciously 
compensated the Iroquois; the Iroquois understood this and used their neutrality to gain 
power and influence, as well as expand their control over other Indians further to the 
south (e.g., the Cherokee and Catawbas). 
During the next two wars between France and Great Britain (Queen Anne’s War 
1702–1713, and King George’s War 1744–1748), the Iroquois were able to “drag their 
feet” and/or “side step” committing themselves.  This inaction did not cause France or 
Britain to break relations with the Iroquois.  However, what was a near perfect situation 
for the Iroquois would not last forever.  In the fourth and final French and Indian War 
(Seven Years War 1754–1763), friction was such that Britain and France entered into a 
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zero-sum game.  Each country viewed everything through the prism of having others as 
enemies.  The Iroquois were forced to choose sides.  Given the outcome of this war, 
Great Britain’s triumph, the British believed they had a freehand in North America. 
This perceived free hand, however, was in fact tied to the natives.  The British 
badly misread the situation in the pays de haunt.  It turned out the Iroquois never 
controlled the Algonquians to the extent the British were led to believe.  No single entity 
absolutely controlled all of the Algonquian tribes in the pays d’en haut; nor were the 
Algonquian ready for anyone (European or Amerindian) to try.  At the same time, just 
because the Algonquian had not previously been unified, did not mean they would not try 
to band together in the face of Anglo settlers’ encroachment onto their lands.  The 
problem was intra-tribal rivalry prevented one true leader from stepping up.  According 
to White: 
The inability to unite against the British was only one sign of the 
underlying divisions of the pays d’en haut.  Without the French, groups of 
associated villages, such as the ones at Detroit or along the Ohio, became 
planets without a sun.  There was nothing to keep them in their orbits and 
they collided and clashed.  They betrayed one another to the British, and 
eventually they fought.35  
This disunity initially gave the British the upper hand and should have led to their 
ultimate control over the tribes in this region.  The British could have assumed the role of 
father to the Algonquians that was abandoned by the retreating French. But they did not.  
Instead of acting like a father or even like a brother as the Algonquians expected, the 
British behaved like conquerors.  The people and their lands were spoils of war won from 
the French in battle and solidified by treaty (Treaty of Paris 1763).36  The British returned 
to running their colonial assets as efficiently as possible.  In order to do this, they reduced 
the amount of gifts given and gunpowder sold.  Additionally, the British provided little to 
no aid when the Algonquians faced crop failures, famine, and other medical issues.  
White conveys how all Algonquians felt by relating a story about a party of Mingos who 
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approached the local British commander for aid to their sick and undernourished women 
and children.  The British failed to render aid, which further enraged the Amerindians.37  
The irate Algonquian no longer viewed the British as indifferent rulers; they began to 
consider them enemies.  The British failure to nurture and to develop a balanced and 
peaceful relationship with the Algonquian led to “calls for revolt…and nostalgia for [the 
French Colonial government]—the good father who had united his children.”38 
British policies influenced the ascension of new nativist leaders who were part of 
an Indian spiritual movement.  These nativists believed the only way to regain favor with 
the “Great Spirit” was to return to the “old ways” by renouncing all things associated 
with Europe;  this renunciation included resistance to the increasing number of Anglo 
settlers encroaching on the pays d’en haut. The conflagration started when the 
Algonquians (led by an Ottawa war leader named Pontiac) laid siege to the British 
garrison at Fort Detroit.39  With little to no prior coordination with other neighboring 
Algonquian tribes, Pontiac’s siege of Fort Detroit inspired a rebellion that resulted in the 
British losing all but their three of the largest pays d’en haut forts (Detroit, Niagara, and 
Pitt). 
Once again, the British leadership did not fully understand the issue at hand as 
they sent forces to subdue the revolt.  The British felt that in order to subdue the rebels 
they must increase their direct control.  Anderson helps explain the flaw in this logic, 
identifying British sovereignty as “the root, not the solution, of the [Amerindian] 
problems.”40  The tighter the British pulled the reins the more fiercely the Algonquians 
bucked.  The Algonquians were accustomed to the French style of rule.  The French were 
not viewed as rulers, but as “fathers” and trade partners.  The Algonquians were 
perplexed about why their French “fathers” had abandoned them to the British.  
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Additionally, the Algonquians did not understand how it was possible that British 
colonists were now settling Algonquian land since they had not lost to the British in war. 
Pontiac’s Rebellion further illuminated the extent to which the British did not 
sufficiently understand the Amerindians.  The British felt the rebellion was simply a 
French plot to regain lost territories.  Yet, the rebellion was a great deal more than just 
some French conspiracy.  The rebellion was the Algonquian response to “conquest, white 
encroachment and [British Amerindian] policies…”41  Their response was possible 
because all the tribes of the pays d’en haut were joined together through a spiritual desire 
to return to their pre-contact way of life.  Realizing they were not strong enough to repel 
the British, the tribes prayed that the “Great Spirit” would help. 
The Algonquians did not exactly receive answers to their prayers in the fashion 
they had hoped.  The French did not return to “liberate” them.  Nor did the nativist return 
to the olden days occur; the British also did not leave the pays d’en haut.42  Instead, the 
British gradually recognized the error of their ways and sought to repair their relations 
with the Algonquian.  Unfortunately, this took three years of conflict.  At the conclusion 
of Pontiac’s Rebellion, the reasons the Algonquian failed to unify previously re-emerged.   
The Algonquian were never one people operating in unison. Once the unifying factor of 
harsh British rule was removed, the Algonquian resumed in their intra-tribal conflicts. 
Ironically, the British believed they could unify all the pays d’en haut by making 
Pontiac “leader” of the Algonquian people.  The British elevated Pontiac to the level of 
chief to establish an Iroquois-like relationship with the Algonquians; but unfortunately 
for Pontiac and the British, the Algonquians did not want a chief, let alone one chosen by 
Britain.  Algonquians rebuked Pontiac and forced him into exile.  When the British 
finally recognized they were not able to create a pays d’en haut nation, they attempted to 
“imitate the French system of gifts and medals … [and] instituted regulated trade.  
[French fathers] were replaced…with British fathers.”43 Over time, this method of 
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interaction proved too expensive and the British colonial government did not receive 
sufficient funding for such lavish endeavors.  Additionally, the “cultural and social 
middle ground on which the alliance must finally rest,” never solidified. 44 
Unable to create an environment of harmony and a sense of family, the British 
eventually reverted to destabilizing the Algonquians by focusing Algonquian attacks 
against each other instead of against the British.  The uneasy peace continued. Unlike the 
French settlers of the past who integrated into Algonquian society, British settlers simply 
claimed land and threatened Amerindian families and well-being.  The British colonial 
government thereby lost control of both sides.  The friction created was destined to erupt 
into yet another, more bloody and costly rebellion; this second Indian rebellion was 
thwarted not through British control but through a lack of British control in the form of 
colonial rebellion.  The British colonists (now Americans) took up arms against the 
British crown over the levying of new taxes (ironically, taxes levied to provide troops to 
protect the colonists from the Amerindians).  The pays d’en haut Algonquians as well as 
other Amerindians again had the opportunity to choose sides.  Although, the American 
Revolution (1775–1783) did not result in a restoration of Algonquian lands in the pays 
d’en haut, the war did answer Algonquian prayers that another white power would come 
along to counterbalance the British.  The main lesson the British did take away from their 
efforts in North America was that “to assert direct sovereignty…to render the Indians 
docile and industrious...”45 was not feasible or possible. 
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III. GREAT BRITAIN IN INDIA 
As in North America, France and Britain sought to expand their control in South 
Asia.  Both countries viewed the Indian subcontinent as a resource rich land.  Unlike 
North America, France and Britain did not plan to settle India; they looked to further their 
commercial interests.  Neither government had the capacity to support the massive 
outlays required to span the globe in search of resources and trade.  Because of this 
limitation, chartered companies were formed to undertake these tasks.  Chartered 
companies were private entities that received funding from investors and obtained rights 
and powers from the sovereign (head of state).  D.K. Fieldhouse describes in The 
Colonial Empires how chartered companies became the best fit for European commercial 
interests in the East.  Fieldhouse cites three particular benefits that accrued from utilizing 
chartered companies: “1) monopoly of trade between the company’s country and the east, 
2) founded with private capital and, 3) the company goal was acquisition of wealth 
through trade not imperialism.”46 These three goals formed the foundation for European 
expansion in India.  The French Compagnie located its bases in Pondicherry 
(headquarters), Chandanagar, Yanam, Mahe, and Karaikal; British trading company 
bases were in Madras, Bombay, and Calcutta.47  Just as in North America, neither 
European nation had initial supremacy upon arrival. 
The Europeans arrived as the existing Mughal Empire was unraveling.  The 
Mughals were descendents of the Timurid; they were a “dynasty of interlopers who had 
founded their Indian empire in the mid-sixteenth century, and whose pedigree stretched 
back to the fourteenth-century conqueror, Timur the Great (Tamburlaine).”48  These 
“interlopers” established Muslim rule over Hindu peoples.  Although there was the 
appearance of total control, the Mughals based their control on the emperor’s mastery of 
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statecraft vis-a-vis subordinate Hindu rulers.  This mastery ended in 1707 with the death 
of Mughal Emperor Aurangzeb.49  Subsequent emperors were inept (or unable) to 
manage their sub-rulers.  As the empire declined, the provinces became independent in 
practice, but still acknowledged de jure Mughal control.50 
The many subordinate Nizams-ul-Mulk (Administrator of the Realm) and Nawabs 
(Provincial Governors) headed what amounted to independent states.51  The major 
powers in the central and southern portions of India were the Marathas. Maratha chiefs 
began as Hindus who rebelled against Mughal expansion.  The British thought of them 
“as a ragbag of conflicting anarchies” because the Marathas had no unity of government 
(not politically, legally, or fiscally).52 Although the British disparaged them, nevertheless 
the Marathas posed “the greatest threat to their commercial tranquility because of their 
predatory instincts, aggressive dynamism, and high mobility which facilitated strategic 
surprise.” 53  
As Lawrence James explains in British Raj, the Marathas “dominated a broad 
swathe of land which stretched from the Sutlej in the north across the Deccan to the 
frontiers of Hyderabad and Mysore.”54 The leaders (princes) of the Marathas, “loosely 
joined in a confederation, found it almost impossible to act together politically and 
militarily.” 55 Their original existence was as overlords levying “taxes” on their vassals. 
Only gradually did Maratha chiefs evolve “into definite sovereigns of territorial states, 
intensely militaristic, and ever ready to pick quarrels with their neighbors and with each 
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other.”56  During this transformation, the Maratha confederacy continued to “tax” those 
in their territories as well as to plunder and raid neighboring provinces; these actions 
further weakened the empire as well as forced provinces to continue distancing 
themselves from the Mughals.  
  According to Sir A.C. Lyall in Rise and Expansion of British Dominion in India, 
during the disintegration of the Mughal Empire: 
The Indian people were becoming a masterless multitude swaying to and 
fro in the political storm and clinging to any power, natural or 
supernatural, that seemed likely to protect them.  They were prepared to 
acquiesce in the assumption of authority by anyone who could show 
himself able to discharge the most elementary functions of government in 
the preservation of life and property.  In short, the people were scattered 
without a leader or protector; while the political system under which they 
had long lived was disappearing in complete disorganization.57 
The Indians no longer looked to the Mughals as the balancing force on the 
subcontinent; they awaited a new power to align the many conflicting states. 
As in North America, the major competitors by the late seventeenth century in 
India were France and Britain.  Neither European state retained sole control over Indian 
trade.  British inability to dislodge Dutch control of the East Indies shifted their focus 
from the East Indies to India.  In Rise and Fulfillment of British Rule in India, Edward 
Thompson and G. T. Garratt cite 1623 as the year when waning British influence in the 
East Indies caused them to redirect their attention toward India. Also seeking to penetrate 
the Asian trade routes, France revived its East Indie Compagnie. The simultaneous 
decline of the Mughal Empire left the British, French, and Marathas “face to face as 
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contestants for India’s sovereignty.”58  The Marathas filled a power vacuum in the areas 
they “controlled,” but were not able to bring the enter empire under their suzerainty.  
Interestingly enough, neither of the European players initially sought to completely 
replace the Mughals either.   
At first, the French and British companies refrained from meddling in Indian 
affairs; they also avoided being dragged into conflict with each other when fighting 
occurred in Europe.  Their main goal was to avoid conflict and its subsequent 
fortification requirements.  The purpose of the European factories was to make a profit.  
Battles and skirmishes (as well as preparing for them) reduced profits.  However, this 
mindset would not last forever.  India’s continued descent into instability created an 
environment in which European neutrality could not last.59  The first major shift occurred 
when the French Compagnie sought to increase revenue via “the rights of taxation which 
went with the ownership of [Indian] territory.”60  Territorial expansion as a revenue 
generator coupled with more European forces arriving in the Indian Ocean increased 
frictions; newly arriving British and French naval forces stoked nationalistic biases in the 
Europeans residing in India.  Seizing on the French Compagnie officials allied with India 
Nawabs in the Carnatic region around Pondicherry.  The Indian troops, led by French 
company officers, attacked and defeated the minimally defended British Company city of 
Madras.  The initial French success came to too little, however.  In 1748, the British 
overcame their defeat thanks to “greater military and financial resource.”  Britons also 
came to play “Indian politics as effectively as [the French].”61  The next round of 
                                                 
58 Thompson and Garratt, Rise and Fulfillment of British Rule in India, 16. Thompson and Garratt 
describe the establishment of the British East India Company in the Persian Gulf and India through conflict 
and consolidation with its Portuguese and Dutch rivals.   The friction and conflict between British and other 
European powers did not cease in 1623.  British interests continued to fight with Portuguese and Dutch 
throughout much of the 17th century.  In 1662, Britain and Portugal merged their interests with the royal 
marriage of Charles II to Catherine of Braganza p30.   But this only quelled the violence between Britain 
and Portugal.  British and Dutch conflict continued until 1689 when William Prince of Orange 
(Netherlands) became William III, King of England, Scotland and Ireland. Refer to Williamson Short 
History: The Old Colonial Empire Chapter VI “The East India Company, 1600 – 1657, for British exploits 
against the Portuguese and Dutch. 
59 Williamson, Short History: The Old Colonial Empire, 364. 
60 Thompson and Garratt, Rise and Fulfillment of British Rule in India, 17. 
61 Fieldhouse, The Colonial Empires, 165. 
  23
hostilities grouped inside King George’s War (a.k.a., The War of Austrian Succession 
1744–48) concluded with the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle (1748).  Unfortunately, this peace 
merely ended hostilities; the peace terms did not resolve any of the antebellum issues 
“upon which Great Britain had fought [France].”62 
The uneasy peace did not last long in India.  Both sides aligned against the other 
via local Indian rivals, and shortly after the “peace” of 1748, British and French company 
forces were at war again via their Indian allies.  The tense situation resulted in both sides 
having “more troops in India than they cared to have…but neither dared disarm…”63  
The availability of arms allowed each side “to offer” the services of their troops in Indian 
succession disputes; the monetary compensation from the Indians aided in their cost 
reductions.64  In 1754, French Compagnie directors in France sought to reverse the policy 
of intervention and encourage peace between all parties (French, British, and Indian 
factions).  But whatever fragile peace was secured again crumbled, this time thanks to 
Anglo-French conflagrations in the forests of North America. 
France and Britain entered into another war.  The Seven Years War (1763), latter 
dubbed the first “world war,” determined which nation would be dominant in the world.  
Both countries fought for their interests in North America, the West Indies, Europe, 
Southwest Asia, and South Asia.  This war marked the beginning of British domination 
on the Indian subcontinent.  The Peace of Paris (1783) returned to France its main Indian 
bases, but the terms of the treaty called for base fortifications to be destroyed and never 
rebuilt.   Defenseless bases ended the likelihood of the French staging a resurgence in 
India.  Indian leaders realized French forces could no longer counterbalance British 
forces.  The British continued to worry about French intervention, but chances of this 
diminished as Britain’s naval power eclipsed France’s power at sea.  Even with a 
diminished French presence, peaceful existence in India proved illusory.  France sought 
to regain a foothold in India during its subsequent wars with Britain (The American 
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Revolution 1775–1783, and The Napoleonic Wars 1803–1815).  In 1782–83, France 
almost re-established a stronghold, but the Treaty of Paris (1783) returned India to the 
status quo antebellum.  After 1815, France never again seriously challenged British 
supremacy in India.65 
Although France posed no threat after 1815, the Anglo-French struggle prior to 
1815 set in motion policies and actions that consciously (as well as unconsciously) 
“launched the British… on a policy of Indian alliances and territorial expansion from 
which there was no return.” 66  The British capitalized on the French absence to extend 
their influence in the Carnatic region.  Simultaneously, the British became the de facto 
rulers of Bengal.  During the Seven Years War, the British sought to protect their base in 
Calcutta, Fort William.  Aware of British manipulation in the Carnatic region, the Nawab 
of Bengal did not want them interfering in his realm.  Nevertheless, with the aid of the 
Nawab’s political enemies, the British defeated him.  Although the British did not 
become the official rulers of Bengal, the British East India Company officials controlled 
the region by using the Nawab as a puppet.  Essentially, the British grafted their 
leadership on to the pre-existing political structures in Bengal. Again worth reiterating is 
that the conquest of India was not Britain’s conscious goal.  The British instead acted to 
secure their trade bases and routes.  These actions were tactics that when grouped 
together, yielded what looks like a strategy; the British company executed a “serious of 
tactical decisions made in response to local and sometimes unexpected crises.”67 
British alliances with local Indian rulers survived even after the French presence 
diminished.  Indian allies thus called upon the British when they went to war with rival 
Indian factions.  By the early 1800s, without necessarily intending to, Britain transitioned 
from accidental occupier to purpose driven conquistador.  Alliances drove expansion and 
expansion led to new alliances.  As victories over rivals brought new territories into the 
British sphere of influence, new neighbors made for new rivals.  The more new allies the 
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British acquired, and the more rivals they defeated, the more this enhanced perceptions of 
British invincibility. This contributed to further expansion.  With every battlefield 
victory, the “British prestige soared.  If, for some reason, British forces were overcome or 
forced to retire, Britain’s standing was diminished throughout India.”68 
The reality of control and power rested upon the perception of British supremacy 
over all.  By 1818, the British had subjugated India’s two major powers, the Nawab of 
Bengal and Maratha Confederacy.  The British ruled Bengal from behind the scenes and 
controlled “all [Maratha lands] necessary for security...”69 From these two areas, Britain 
consolidated its power and expanded outwards.  The hundred years from 1757–1857 
witnessed the British conquest of the entire Indian sub-continent. 70   
Victorious on the field of battle, Britons needed to follow this up with effective 
governance.  Without a compliant Indian population, the British would not be able to 
maintain control over them.  Their two options were direct and indirect rule.  Direct rule 
required Britons function as the ruling authority; indirect rule allowed native rulers and 
princes to maintain authority so long as their actions met the approval of British 
administrators.  Because of India’s geographical vastness and given the varied timing and 
methods of conquest, the British controlled India via both methods.  In areas with a 
strong British presence (i.e., Bengal), the British applied direct rule.  Remote areas (i.e., 
Hyderabad) with a sparse British presence defaulted to the indirect method.  Regardless 
of the method of control, everyone answered to the Governor-General (after 1858, the 
Viceroy) and ultimate authority originated from the Company headquarters in London.71  
Although initial control was exerted by a chartered company, the British East 
Indian Company, events, and perceived (and actual) mismanagement led to eventual 
takeover by the British government.  Concerned officials sought to rein in the Company’s 
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dealings in India.  Corruption and adventurism overcame Company officials’ better 
judgment.  The Regulation Act of 1773 attempted to rid the Company of corruption by 
increasing the Company Governor-General’s reliance on the British government.72  This 
act proved to be ineffective; although the Governor was a parliament appointee, he still 
answered to the Company.  Ten years after the Regulation Act of 1773, Parliament 
sought to transfer complete Indian sovereignty to the British government.  The initial 
legislation failed; a year later parliament enacted the India Bill of 1784.  The Company 
retained control over trade and Indian patronage, but all other matters (civil, military, and 
revenue collection) were transferred to a governmental Board of Control.73  The aim with 
this system of rule was to govern British India more efficiently; hindsight demonstrates, 
however, that “this dual system was illogical, but worked well and lasted until 1858.”74  
The new arrangements decoupled the administrative and commercial components of rule. 
From the enactment of the India Bill in 1784 until 1858, the British sought to 
bring the Indian population into the modern era.  The drive toward modernity affected 
many aspects of Indian life.  The intent was to reorganize Indian society to better mirror 
British society.  It was felt this realignment would enable the Indians to more easily 
transition towards a modern existence.  The scope of the changes introduced affected 
religion, governance, taxation, land reform, wealth, titles, etc.75  But such a swift march 
toward progress became more than many Indians could accept.  The breaking point came 
in May of 1857.  By this point the “passion for reform and change was out of control and 
Indians had more change than they could absorb.”76  Relations around the country were 
tense; one British official in India said he “sensed that something was wrong, although 
[he] could not say exactly what.”77  The spark that kindled the revolt came from of an 
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Army mutiny.  The mutineers stormed Delhi and proclaimed the Mughal Emperor, not 
the British, the ruler of India. Without any prior coordination, many disgruntled Indian 
soldiers and civilians joined the revolt. 78  It took eighteen months for the British to fully 
stamp out the revolt.  Hindsight reveals that there was probably little chance for success 
given the fractured nature of the groups involved in the mutiny.  However, there were a 
few months after May 1857 when the revolt could have exploded into a wider war had 
the various factions united under one leader.79  
Although the mutineers did not succeed, the revolt caused the British to 
implement significant changes to their rule.  While still fighting to put down remnants of 
the revolt, the British government enacted the Government of India Act of 1858.  This act 
dissolved the East India Company’s charter and transferred all its assets to the British 
Crown.  All Indian affairs handled by the Company were transferred to a government 
council headed by the Secretary of State for India.  The new head official in India was 
elevated from Governor-General to Viceroy.  The British government assumed full 
responsibility for India.  Although British repression of the Mutiny and subsequent 
transfer of sole authority to the Crown addressed the most visible issues, underlying 
reasons for disgruntlement remained and continued to drive a wedge between British 
rulers and Indian subjects.  Although the revolt itself did not succeed in liberating Indians 
in 1857, the Mutiny marked the point from which days of British rule were numbered.   
Less than a century later, the Indians were still seeking independence.  Instead of the 
unorganized violence of 1857, Indians unified via civil disobedience in 1947, forcing the 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
At this point one might ask, “What is relevant to U.S. foreign policy about 
studying two instances of British imperial history?”  Even though British and U.S. ideas 
about foreign expansion differ, one can still learn lessons about exerting control and/or 
influence abroad by studying British experiences.  The two case studies examined in 
Chapters II and III above offer a broad-stroke overview of British efforts to exert control 
in North America and India.  The bodies of literature for both North America and Indian 
history are voluminous. Nonetheless, even a quick tour through some of the literature 
suggests ways in which past British experiences might aid the U.S. in its near term and 
future interactions with weak states and/or tribal societies. 
The current international system developed in the aftermath of the Second World 
War (1939–1945).  Prior to World War II, a small number of Western European and 
North American states (as well as Russia and Japan) controlled international relations.  
There was no formal international body through which great powers could have their 
disputes arbitrated.  The absence of such a body was one of the contributing factors to 
renewed conflict in the 1930s and 1940s.  The new international system, which rose from 
the ashes of these tumultuous decades, resurrected and improved on the idea of a League 
of Nations. Although there were ideological and regime differences between the U.S. and 
its main adversary, Soviet Russia, both sides agreed about the nation-state as the unit of 
account.  The world’s nation-states were divided into two camps: those in the U.S. camp 
supported a democratic/free market economy, and those in the Soviet camp supported a 
communist/central command economy.  Both camps used the nation-state as the basic 
unit upon which to build and control alliances. 
In order to connect the idea that internal notions of social control can be used for 
external (international) control purposes as well, one needs to refer to Lebow and Kelly’s 
"Thucydides and Hegemony;” this is an example of internal ideas of social control and 




To secure and maintain the voluntary compliance of allies or subjects, 
[arkhe] need to behave in a manner consistent with their claims and 
professed values. They must forego short-term gains that threaten the 
longer-term stability and survival of their alliance…80  
Just as nation-states require legitimacy from their society, the societies of the 
world must believe in international institutions for them to be legitimate.  As Bruce 
Gilley points out in The Right to Rule, the “international system must serve political 
legitimacy, which remains within the ambit of states.”81  Legitimacy thus depends on all 
involved, both locally and internationally, believing and supporting this political 
legitimacy.  The difficulties come when different two societal types interact.  
Coming full circle, this returns the thesis to Lugard’s ideas about governance 
outlined in the first chapter.  The three types of governance—self-government; self-
government under a native ruler with non-native councilors and administrators; and rule 
by a native chief unfettered in his control of his people, but subordinate to control by the 
protecting power—offer three varieties of control.82  Self-government assumes that 
traditional societies are ready to become modern societies; this transformation, in turn, 
permits the new nation-state to be governed by the rule-set recognized by the existing 
international system.  Yet, as Lugard noted, self-governance was not a realistic solution 
for most.  He cited challenges inherent in “numerous separate tribes, speaking different 
languages, in different stages of societal development…”83  He recognized that a 
complete shift from traditional governance to a modern republic or constitutional 
monarchy would prove disastrous.  He did acknowledge India’s “experiment” with self-
governance.  When Lugard penned his book, India resided firmly in the British realm.  
Since then, India broke free from British domination and is today the world’s largest 
democracy. The important point to take away is that Britain did not immediately allow 
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complete self-governance in India.  Indians ran the government and its associated 
administrative functions with British oversight.84  India’s example suggests self-
government can be a viable option, but traditional societies require internal and/or 
external forcing functions to compel them to shed their traditional forms of governance.   
Self-government via a native ruler with non-native influence and oversight is 
known as direct rule.  The government puts on a literal native face.  A native rules, but is 
guided by non-natives. According to Lugard, only advanced communities were capable 
of this.  He recognized the lack of fit between this type of control and traditional societies 
at the tribal level.  Possessing the structures or at least some of the structures of a state is 
a prerequisite.  As seen in the Indian case study, the British easily assumed control of 
Bengal via this method.  The Nawab of Bengal retained his “authority,” but British 
officials guided him in directions that most benefited them. 
In contrast to direct rule is indirect rule; indirect rule is rule by a native rule under 
the control of the protecting power.  The native ruler proves able to overcome internal 
rivals thanks to his external supporter; in return, the native ruler obeys his supporter’s 
wishes.  To some extent, this describes the early Anglo-Iroquois relations.  The British 
tilted the balance of power among the Iroquois to the Anglophile members of the Iroquois 
Great Council; subsequently, these council members controlled Iroquois internal and 
external policies. Thanks to this relationship and with the aid of British weaponry, the 
Iroquois expanded their area of dominion.  By doing this, Britain retained a strong ally 
that would do its bidding in North America. 
Using Lugard’s examples and the case studies, it is possible to consider how the 
U.S. might better apply its power. The default instinct of the U.S. seems to be to mold 
other societies into nation-states in its own image.  Although this is one option available, 
it might not always be the best fit for the society in question.  In  After War, Christopher 
Coyne explains how the “U.S. has attempted to export Western style democracy via 
military occupation numerous times over the past century, but ironically, policymakers 
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have neglected the factors that have allowed these institutions to sustain [themselves] 
over the long run in their home country.”85  Coyne’s implication is that U.S. society 
created institutions that most suited it; it was not institutions that created society.  U.S. 
institutions work for Americans because Americans do not “sacrifice their own self-
interests for that of the larger community, but rather …realize….that his or her private 
interests are directly connected to the interests of the larger group and community.”86 
Coyne calls this the art of association.  These associations between people, as well as 
between the people and the government, are crucial when assessing what is most likely to 
work for other societies. 
Looking to the case studies, one can see how important mechanisms of rule or 
control are, and why it is important they fit each society’s norms and traditions.  In the 
North American example, the Five Nations progressed from individual villages to a 
confederation of tribes.  The confederation had a tribal council that made decisions for all 
tribes under its banner.  The pre-contact nature of this council made it organic and not 
alien to the Iroquois.  The British made military and commercial covenants with the 
Iroquois via this council.  The practice of leaders speaking for the Five Nations allowed 
the British to better control the area.  Instead of negotiating with hundreds of village 
leaders, Britons simply controlled influential council members.  These members in turn 
controlled the council and the council’s legitimacy enabled them to ‘control’ the Five 
Nations. 
Conversely, the Algonquian tribes formed no national councils.  A few 
individuals led each village.  Being led by a national council or chief, was an alien 
concept.  The Algonquians followed different leaders at different times.  The British tried 
and failed to force a chief upon them.  After putting down Pontiac’s Rebellion, the British 
sought to create an Algonquian confederacy.  Instead of borrowing the Iroquois council 
model, the British sought to make the rebellion’s leader, Pontiac, chief over the 
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Algonquian people.  Although Pontiac was not foreign to them, the idea of a chief was 
foreign.  The British attempt to elevate Pontiac also tainted his legitimacy.  Algonquians 
saw him for what he was, a puppet. 
From these interactions and events, one can conclude that it is most beneficial to 
control traditional societies via a select few who legitimately govern the nation.  The 
challenge is to guide a nation away from being a collection of many autonomous villages 
toward having some mechanism of effective central control.  Lugard’s advice was “to 
clothe [the] principles in the garb of evolution not of revolution.”87 The trick was to make 
members of the society believe change resulted from their desire and not from an external 
force. 
Changing a society against its will is a monumental undertaking for any member 
of that society, let alone for a non-member.  The British consciously and unconsciously 
understood the importance of using pre-existing regimes and governments to maintain 
control over populations in India.  British rule via both direct and indirect methods in 
India was based on necessity rather than design.  The projection of legitimate control via 
these two methods served them well.  The British style of governance was little different 
from that of the Mughals.  By keeping pre-existing social structures, the British were able 
to maintain the balance between the governed and the governors. 
Although the British had to subdue various elements around the Indian 
subcontinent, a major uprising did occur due to the introduction of social changes.  This 
uprising occurred when the British sought to change Indian social norms and interactions.  
The thinking was that in order to make the Indians more modern, they needed to be 
British.  One goal in making the Indians modern was this would allow the Indians to 
achieve Lugard’s first type of control, self-governance.  However, the social changes 
required to achieve this led to the Mutiny of 1857.   
The British formed relationships with non-Western societies against the backdrop 
of great power competition in both North America and India.  British relationships were 
formed as a counterbalance to French local influence.  Understandably, local societies 
played the two powers against each other.  Ironically, it was when the French option 
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faded as a counterbalance that the British had the most difficulty controlling locals.  
Thinking they had a freer hand to do as they pleased proved to be unwise.  The situation 
required more attention because factions were no longer divided into just two camps 
(pro-British and pro-French); the factions splintered with every group for itself. This 
situation called for more troops in North America to defend against the Amerindians and 
for more conquest and more alliances in India to subdue the belligerent princes and 
nawabs.  Each course of action resulted in a deeper entanglement and an inability to sever 
undesirable associations.  The American Revolution and Britain’s subsequent loss of a 
significant portion of its North American colonies was the result of more troops (and 
associated taxes) in North America. The subjugation of the Indian subcontinent resulted 
from continued British expansion.  In both cases, there was no clear-cut plan to facilitate 
a withdrawal when the situation was more costly than beneficial. 
From these observations, it should be possible to formulate a few takeaways to 
help govern U.S. interactions with weak state nations and tribal societies that produce 
positive policy results for the U.S.  By no means should these lessons be considered all-
inclusive.  They merely represent a starting point for further exploration on how best to 
focus native efforts towards desire U.S. outcomes.  
The first lesson is to understand there will be pre-existing rivalries and power 
struggles upon U.S. arrival anywhere.  Any U.S. attempt at neutrality is futile.  
Eventually one side will favor the U.S. and the other side will oppose the U.S.  Examples 
can be seen in both case studies.  The Iroquois and the Algonquian were already pitted 
against each other when the British arrived.  Not only were there external, inter-tribal 
Amerindian tribal rivalries, one can also see internal, intra-tribal rivalries in both groups.  
The Iroquois Nation almost imploded into civil war when the various factions (Anglo, 
Franco, and neutral) vied with each other for control.  In the India case study, the 
Marathas were one group that formed to thwart Mughal expansion in central India. Not 
only does one see friction between rival Indian groups, one also sees internecine friction.  
The Nawab of Bengal was removed from power due to the fissures between him and the 
elites in his court.  The British were able to exploit this division because they were aware 
of its existence. 
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Pre-engagement ethnographic intelligence (if available) should help the U.S. from 
walking into situations blind.  Clear understanding of the situation –for instance, 
identification of key power players, rivalries, causes of rivalries, etc–should enable U.S. 
representatives to maintain an upper hand while avoiding various pitfalls.  The U.S. 
should not blindly choose sides.  Nor should it choose sides immediately. Eventually, the 
U.S. needs to back one side.  The key to choosing a side is remembering that the U.S. is 
not wedded to this side forever.  Once the society develops its state, regime, and 
government, the U.S. needs to respect that country’s political process.  Knowing when to 
step back is critically important. 
Second, the U.S. must remain in the background, not the foreground. Again 
returning to Lugard, the U.S. needs “to make it apparent alike to the educated native, the 
conservative Moslem, and the primitive pagan, each in his own degree, that the policy is 
not antagonistic but progressive—sympathetic to his aspirations and the guardian of his 
natural rights.”88  Remaining in the background seems to be counter to what the British 
did.  Most of their actions placed them in the foreground in order to control the locals.  
The placement of British officials in the foreground gave local antagonists the perfect 
focal point upon which to rally local dissention.  In the Amerindian case study, the 
Mingos looked to the British for aid and not other Algonquians because the British were 
in the foreground.  The British refusal to assistance provided further fodder for nativists 
to rally their supports.  If the British had remained in the background and supplied aid 
through other Algonquians, the nativists would not have been able to focus most 
Algonquians against a common foe, the British.   
No one likes others to tell him what to do.  Most Americans dislike the policies 
that are formulated in Washington; why should non-Americans under U.S. control be any 
different?  Every major event and milestone should reflect a local input.  There are times 
when this may not be possible, but every effort needs to be made to promote and use 
local-born solutions and actions.  Let the locals be the locals. Additionally, the U.S. 
advisors should do just that: “advise.”  An advisor is an individual from whom one seeks 
guidance.  An advisor should never dictate a plan of action.  U.S. officials should only 
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intervene when policies and practices are contrary to U.S. interests. This accomplishes 
two goals: 1) the locals see their government—not the foreigners—providing for them 
(which bolster its legitimacy); 2) the government becomes self-reliant and does not 
require U.S. help in every instance.  One does need to be prepared, however, for when the 
locals say no.  Even when the U.S. has had significant military presences inside other 
nations, these host nations have taken actions contrary to U.S. interests.  
Third, the U.S. needs to understand actions taken today can have significant 
complicating effects tomorrow.  Fifty plus years ago, the U.S. made decisions and actions 
in the interests of that time.  Some of the actions sown then have led to disastrous results 
today. This thesis is not arguing that every decision and action must be assessed for all its 
potential effects.  U.S. policy makers need to make decisions that have positive results at 
the time.  But, they also need to be aware of people’s collective memories when returning 
to an area or approaching societies after there has been a major international power shift.   
The fourth lesson to bear in mind is to understand each society’s specific art of 
association (the way in which people interact with each other and institutions) as it 
applies to their ideas about governance.  In both case studies, the Algonquians (during 
Pontiac’s Rebellion) and the Indians (during the Mutiny of 1857) rebelled against the 
British when alien ideas or rules were imposed.  The U.S., since its birth, has been the 
benchmark for all nations striving to be mature liberal democracies.  The irony is the U.S. 
is not a democracy; it is a representative republic.  Our founders realized that the 
American art of association required checks and balances not only for the branches of 
government, but also for or on people.  Americans forget that when its constitution was 
penned most of its citizens were not eligible to vote; even though all men were created 
equal, some men remained in bondage.  All too often the U.S. desires societies elsewhere 
to spontaneously transform themselves into mature liberal democracies like itself.  This 
overlooks one detail; the current U.S. art of association took more than two hundred years 
to mature into its present form.  The true brilliance Americans should export is the 
example of founding documents that established an ideal and expectations for future 
generations to strive to meet/to live up to. This is more fitting for other people then trying 
to adopt the actual American art of association.  This is how the U.S. needs to help 
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transformations occur:  understand the art of association for that society.  Understand that 
other people will not immediately shed their ways.  Have the kind of patience and 
foresight that made our founders heroic to all Americans.  The U.S. should try to guide 
other societies on a path that best fits them for their journey from the here and now to 
their equivalent of a mature liberal democracy.   
As stated above, these lessons are not a recipe for guaranteed success.  One 
cannot simply add two parts of this, half a cup of that, mix, cook for forty-five minutes in 
the oven, and serve to guests for their enjoyment.  The efforts above require a chef, not a 
cook.  A chef is someone who can take stock of his local ingredients and make a superb 
dish; a cook follows the recipe by substituting local ingredients that do not have the same 
composition and flavor as the non-local ingredients that are familiar to him.  The ideas 
presented here are designed to help make U.S. cooks think more like chefs.  The U.S. for 
the foreseeable future will need agility to operate in all types of regions, communities, 
and societies.  Success depends not only on how well the U.S. controls its environment 
via alliances but also how well it is able to pacify and to incorporate the tribes that still lie 
without. 
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